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INTRODUCTION
The unprecedented global lockdown in response to the COVID-19
pandemic exposed the extreme vulnerability of “essential” yet
underpaid workers, the vast inequality between the wealthy and less
fortunate, and the bottomless pit facing those without a social safety
net.1 While the crisis has exposed the near-universality of human
susceptibility to disease and unemployment in a world in which few
can safely work,2 it has also highlighted the disproportionate
precarity experienced by low-wage and contingent workers, people
of color, and non-citizens.3 Well before the pandemic, rampant
socioeconomic and racial inequality, high underemployment and
concentration of wealth, along with advances in technology,
threatened to render many human workers obsolete, powerless, and
in need of social support and care.4 At the same time, in the United
States, the Trump administration sought to eliminate an already
shrunken social safety net by extending punitive workfare ideology—
originally reserved for poor, single mothers receiving cash
assistance—to all low-income individuals in receipt of any form of
government-funded support, whether health care, nutrition, or

*

1.

2.

3.
4.

Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director, Economic Justice Project, City
University of New York School of Law. I am grateful for generous feedback and
comments from Professors Maxine Eichner, Marie Failinger, Michele E. Gilman,
Anthony Infanti, Jo Littler, Jason Parkin, and Ruthann Robson, and for valuable
feedback and research assistance from Leanna Pohevitz and Ethan Chiel. Thanks to
the Center on Applied Feminism at the University of Baltimore School of Law School
for organizing the Twelfth Feminist Legal Theory Conference, “Applied Feminism
and Privacy” (postponed to April 2021); and to the organizers and participants of the
2020 Feminist Legal Theory Summer Series.
See Areeba Haider, Congress Must Strengthen SNAP to Support Essential Workers
During the Coronavirus Crisis, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 11, 2020, 9:05 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/news/2020/06/11/486187/congressmust-strengthen-snap-support-essential-workers-coronavirus-crisis [https://perma.cc/
94C9-XGLS].
Ruthann Robson, Positive Constitutionalism in a Pandemic: Demanding
Responsibility from the Trump Administration, 12 CONLAWNOW 15, 15–16 (2020)
(delineating the exceptional “[f]ailures of the Trump Administration[‘s]” response to
the pandemic in the United States separate and apart from pre-existing decimation of
the federal social safety net).
See Haider, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Hilary G. Escajeda, Zero Economic Value Humans?, 10 WAKE FOREST J.L.
& POL’Y 129, 129 (2019) (noting Pope Francis’s concern that “technological progress
that replaces the need for human-performed work would be ‘detrimental to
humanity.’”).
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housing assistance.5 Such an ideology effectively conditions public
support for needy individuals—some of whom are already employed
at low wages—on their willingness and ability to engage in more
work regardless of pay, employment conditions, or caregiving
obligations.6 Left largely to their own devices, whether in times of
crisis or calm, advocates have sought to strengthen interpersonal
relationships and community bonds to provide the minimal assistance
the government withholds from those who need it the most, while
also mobilizing to demand basic social support for all members of
society.7
This Article examines two experimental models—restorative
justice and “radical help”—that seek to weave people back into the
fabric of the social safety net and reform welfare administration.8
These social welfare innovations emphasize human relationships as
an underutilized resource to highlight the power of meaningful social
connections, which can help those experiencing everything from
disability, discrimination, or bad luck to not only avoid disaster, but
actually thrive and flourish in strong communities.9 Each model
emphasizes human relationships to help poor people benefit
voluntarily from social support and community engagement, instead
of punishing them for noncompliance with paternalistic and

5.

6.
7.

8.
9.

Exec. Order No. 13,828, 83 Fed. Reg. 15,941, 15,944 (Apr. 10, 2018) (outlining
policy statement to “[i]mprove employment outcomes and economic independence
(including by strengthening existing work requirements for work-capable people and
introducing new work requirements when legally permissible).”); see also Tara
Golshan, Trump Wants to Slash Welfare with Stricter Work Requirements, VOX (Apr.
10, 2018, 7:55 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/10/17221292/trump-welfareexecutive-order-work-requirements [https://perma.cc/UN97-ZLCZ].
See Golshan, supra note 5.
See, e.g., Our Demands, POOR PEOPLE’S CAMPAIGN: A NAT’L CALL FOR MORAL
REVIVAL, https://www.poorpeoplescampaign.org/about/our-demands [https://perma.
cc/2GLS-9A2L] (last visited Dec. 16, 2020) (“We demand fully-funded social welfare
programs that provide cash and in-kind assistance directly to the poor, including poor
families.”); see The Care Collective, COVID-19 Pandemic: A Crisis of Care, VERSO
(Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4617-covid-19-pandemic-a-crisis
-of-care [https://perma.cc/JG47-X2UJ] (calling for “building more caring kinships,
communities, economies, states and worlds[,]” “expan[sion] [of] our notion of
kinship[,]” diversifying forms of care, obligating the state to prioritize “social
provision[,]” and “facilitating greater democratic engagement among communities.”).
See infra Parts II, III.
See Marie A. Failinger, A Truly Good Work: Turning to Restorative Justice for
Answers to the Welfare-to-Work Dilemma, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 209,
242–43 (2008).
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exploitative government program work mandates.10
These
relationships can center poor people’s lived experiences and combine
collaborative, localized, and responsive community support with
technology to facilitate social networking, and ideally, increase
economic security and empowerment.11
At the same time, without appropriate safeguards or oversight,
overreliance on private relationships for social welfare provision
risks replicating existing forms of disempowerment.12 In practice,
both models risk reinscribing a private, marginalized sphere that is
neither restorative nor radical, in which those who perform the work
of nurturing relationships remain subject to the will of those with the
power to offer or withhold assistance.13 Cautious optimism must be
combined with meaningful protections to preserve the most
promising aspects of new models while preventing the worst harms
of what could be, in effect, a return to private, discretionary
provision—or deprivation—of social support.14
Informed by
feminist and antiracist theories critical of both market relations
mediated by the state and private family relations entirely insulated
from oversight,15 this Article concludes that we must continue to
explore and adapt new models of welfare provision that truly protect
and promote all human potential.16
Part I introduces the ideological underpinnings of workfare as
manifested decades ago in welfare reform and its more recent
expansion into other forms of public assistance.17 The rise of work
requirements as a condition of receipt for basic subsistence benefits
reflects entrenched ideas about personal responsibility, as well as
gendered caregiving expectations that value market labor over
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.

See infra Parts II, III.
See Hilary Cottam, The Relational Society: A Response to Michael Rustin, 56
SOUNDINGS 104, 105 (2014) [hereinafter Cottam, The Relational Society].
See id. at 105.
See infra notes 284–89 and accompanying text.
See Suzanne M. Spencer-Wood, The World Their Household: Changing Meanings of
the Domestic Sphere in the Nineteenth Century, in THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF HOUSEHOLD
ACTIVITIES 162, 165 (Penelope Mary Allison ed., 1999) (“Starting in the 1970s some
feminist anthropologists began to critique androcentric biases involved in the explicit
construction of gender as a universal structural dichotomy, in which public active men
dominated women who were devalued as domestic, passive, and subordinate . . . .”).
See infra notes 290–305 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 342–51 and accompanying text.
See infra Part I; see Exec. Order No. 13,828, 83 Fed. Reg. 15,941, 15,944 (Apr. 10,
2018); see also Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, 73 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 285 (2010) (discussing expansion of the earned income tax
credit as a component of 1996 welfare reform espousing work ideology).
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carework and keep women relegated to the home or the low-wage
service sector, regardless of preference.18 This form of punitive
workfare enforces women’s dependence on either market forces or
patriarchal nuclear family structures for daily survival, limiting their
economic mobility and security—and that of future generations.19 In
this way, work ideology operates as a system of moral desert
designed to punish those who do not or cannot conform their
behavior to heterosexist, patriarchal norms.20
Part II describes one alternative to punitive work ideology—i.e.,
restorative justice—advanced by poverty law scholar Marie
Failinger, which seeks to reduce workfare’s harshest effects by
empowering individual participants with the support of their
communities to make valuable social contributions that, in turn,
further strengthen those communities.21 Failinger applies restorative
justice principles to the welfare context and holds individual
participants accountable to their communities for their own economic
decisions and actions, while expanding their capabilities and worklife options.22 As an alternative to assignment of fault and imposition
of economic sanctions, such a model asks what supportive services
the community should provide to its members.23 By taking into
account unquantifiable, intangible strengths or barriers in the same
individual, and allowing for a more realistic, holistic view of personal
progress, restorative justice can adapt to individual circumstances
and needs to achieve human interdependence—rather than a cramped
goal of financial independence.24
Ultimately, while restorative justice can have positive results in the
workfare context, it remains constrained by existing social norms—
including a market–discipline approach to economic selfsufficiency—which inevitably leads back to punishment for
noncompliance with societal obligations.25 In addition, restorative
justice depends on ostensibly voluntary surrender of privacy rights
with insufficient oversight to prevent potential abuses of coercive
18.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Gwendolyn Mink, Violating Women: Rights Abuses in the Welfare Police State
(2001), reprinted in LOST GROUND: WELFARE REFORM, POVERTY, AND BEYOND 95,
109 (Randy Albelda & Ann Withorn eds., 2002) (noting that some feminists accept
work ideology rather than “risk return to compulsory domesticity.”).
See id. at 79–80.
See id.
See infra Part II; Failinger, supra note 9, at 212.
See discussion infra Section II.A.
See, e.g., infra notes 137–39 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 140–57 and accompanying text.
See Failinger, supra note 9, at 242.
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power.26 Without additional legal safeguards for those who continue
to struggle even with the support of their communities, the model
stops short of transforming the existing system that conditions
assistance on moral desert.27
Part III analyzes a second model, a form of relational welfare
developed and designated “radical help” by British designer and
social innovator Hilary Cottam, which identifies human relationships
as society’s greatest resource for helping people realize their own
goals and potential.28 In this model, participants identify the local
community members who are best positioned to support their
individual capabilities, while also acknowledging the structural
context and causes of their specific challenges.29 Radical help aims
to shift the focus of social welfare administration from bureaucracy
and cost-containment to a relational form of welfare driven and
sustained by genuine social bonds that support individuals rather than
abandoning them.30 Like restorative justice, radical help recognizes
nonlinear paths for individual progress, which allow for missteps,31
bypasses bureaucracy in favor of adapting quickly to new and everchanging circumstances,32 and affirms intangible and dignitary values
distinct from the measurable, quantitative costs and benefits
traditionally weighed in the balance.33 Yet, while radical help aims
to short-circuit government bureaucracy through genuine support for
human relationships,34 it too risks unduly privileging the private
sphere without the meaningful oversight of private relationships
needed to prevent exploitation of vulnerable individuals and
safeguard against abuses of power and privilege.35

26.
27.
28.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

35.

See id. at 240–42 (describing informal means of controlling coercive power in
restorative justice circles).
See infra notes 202–06 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III; see also infra notes 207–16 and accompanying text; see also
HILARY COTTAM, RADICAL HELP: HOW WE CAN REMAKE THE RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN US AND REVOLUTIONISE THE WELFARE STATE 205–07 (2018) [hereinafter
COTTAM, RADICAL HELP]; see also Hilary Cottam, Relational Welfare, 48 SOUNDINGS
134, 144 (2011) [hereinafter Cottam, Relational Welfare].
See COTTAM, RADICAL HELP, supra note 28, at 204.
Id. at 184.
See id. at 70.
See id. at 264–66.
See id. at 38.
See Cottam, The Relational Society, supra note 11, at 105 (describing public services
built on relationships as an alternative to state bureaucracies that overshadow personal
relationships).
See infra notes 279–83 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Part IV situates restorative and relational models of
welfare against the rich backdrop of feminist and critical race
theories that challenge neoliberal assumptions of humans as fully
autonomous, unitary subjects and resist a bimodal system of
hierarchy or subordination.36 Such theories illuminate ways to
transcend the market-family dichotomy and transform the stigma of
workfare ideology based on moral desert and the false choices it
presents into a more heterogeneous and dynamic web of social
relations, with all of their nonlinear, intangible, and adaptive
features.37 Viewed in this light, restorative and relational models of
welfare provision lay important groundwork to overcome the social
disconnection and disempowerment imposed by punitive workfare
ideology.38 To lay that groundwork, these models neither tinker
around the edges nor embrace a nostalgic return to the way things
were; instead, they recognize and anticipate global developments that
have eroded the labor market and the patriarchal nuclear family as
traditional—albeit always contested—structures of socioeconomic
support.39
I.

WORKFARE AS PUNISHMENT AND THE MARKETFAMILY DIVIDE

The history of welfare reform in the United States reveals the
powerful ideology of moral desert that limits basic social safety net
support to those who follow the rules—however onerous or
invasive.40 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA)41 restricted federal social
36.
37.

38.

39.
40.
41.

See infra Part IV.
See, e.g., Maxine Eichner, The Family and the Market — Redux, 13 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 97, 98 (2012) (“Feminists have forcefully pointed out that the familymarket demarcation is not a natural or inevitable feature of the world, but instead a
conceptual distinction that is relatively recent, and which was founded on a particular
set of political and economic assumptions.”).
See, e.g., Cottam, Relational Welfare, supra note 28, at 137–40, 143 (discussing value
of relational welfare programs supported by modern technology and story of a family
experiencing social disconnection).
See infra notes 290–97 and accompanying text.
See Failinger, supra note 9, at 214 (describing the tendency to consider welfare
recipients morally and socially different as a dynamic embedded into the structure of
workfare mandates).
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105; see Ezra Rosser, Introduction, in HOLES IN THE SAFETY
NET: FEDERALISM AND POVERTY 1, 5 (Ezra Rosser ed., 2019) (“The move from a
federally funded, rights-based cash welfare system to a block grant system that gave
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spending to sanction single mothers—primarily perceived as Black
“welfare queen[s]” living off the hard work of others42—for behavior
falling outside the patriarchal norms of “job preparation, work, and
marriage.”43 By conditioning receipt of subsistence-level benefits on
compliance with strict rules governing work, family, and other life
choices, workfare operates as an intrusive, punitive, and stigmatizing
method of regulating the labor, sexuality, reproduction, and personal
autonomy of poor people—especially women and people of color.44
Decades later, federally funded cash assistance to families with
dependent children reaches fewer and fewer households due to a
combination of strict time limits on receipt, sanctions for failure to
comply with work requirements,45 and complicated, frequent, and
intrusive rules for verifying ongoing financial need.46 Yet, work
requirements are increasingly featured in other forms of government
assistance, like state waivers for Medicaid and Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance (formerly known as food stamps),47 that have
historically had broader coverage, including for childless adults and
those with greater financial resources.48 As Ezra Rosser observes,
“The challenge when it comes to cash welfare is the tremendous
imbalance between the number of people it serves and the hold it has
on the discourse about poverty.”49 The expansion of work ideology
to all forms of government assistance threatens to eliminate social

42.

43.

44.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

tremendous latitude to states fundamentally rewrote the relationship between
federalism and antipoverty efforts.”).
See Camille Gear Rich, Reclaiming the Welfare Queen: Feminist and Critical Race
Theory Alternatives to Existing Anti-Poverty Discourse, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
257, 258 (2016); see Ann Cammett, Welfare Queens Redux: Criminalizing Black
Mothers in the Age of Neoliberalism, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 363, 391 (2016).
42 U.S.C. § 601 (2012) (establishing block grants to states to implement Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)); see Mink, supra note 18, at 80 (“TANF’s
foremost objective is to restore the patriarchal family.”).
See Mink, supra note 18, at 80. As Monica Bell and her co-authors note, “[a]lthough
welfare rolls have never been majority black or Latinx, ‘controlling images’ of
unmarried black and Puerto Rican women as welfare recipients began to guide
political frames and political action on welfare” in the 1960s. Monica Bell et al.,
Laboratories of Suffering: Toward Democratic Welfare Governance, in HOLES IN THE
SAFETY NET: FEDERALISM AND POVERTY, supra note 41, at 40, 46–47.
Rosser, supra note 41, at 5 (“The 1996 welfare reform act had three major
components: work requirements, time limits, and block grants.”).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 11.
See id. at 9–10.
Id. at 5.
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support for the growing number of people displaced from a shrinking
market for jobs with livable wages.50
Proponents of work requirements as a condition of receiving safety
net benefits ground their argument in the assumption of a social
contract or covenant that exacts social obligation in exchange for
social support.51 As articulated by workfare architect Lawrence
Mead, all major cultural and religious traditions share a consensus
that society is obliged to provide relief to those few citizens who may
suffer bad luck or hardship, and even to forgive those who transgress
social norms.52 That relief must necessarily be confined to a small
and narrowly defined subset of the population.53 In exchange,
recipients of poor relief must demonstrate their willingness to
perform their moral obligation to society to the extent they are able,
and those who do not are left to suffer as a disincentive to shirk their
duties.54 In this way, the number of recipients, in theory, may be
cabined to only the most needy.55
By purporting to eliminate any legal entitlement to basic
subsistence benefits and instead imposing strict time limits and work
mandates, welfare reform enacted a deficit model of poverty as an
unending debt to society owed by inferior people undeserving of any
assistance beyond the narrow and temporary.56 Failinger identifies
an undercurrent of individual deficiency in the punitive history of
public assistance culminating in workfare, which treats “[d]ifference
as [s]ubordinating,” and economic disadvantage as justification for
government oversight and discipline.57 In keeping with what
Failinger coins the “tyranny of legal binaries” that pit work and
morality against need and perceived laziness,58 these assumptions
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 5, 10.
See id. at 5, 13.
Lawrence M. Mead, Moral Overload, AM. AFFAIRS (Jan. 23, 2018), https://
americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/01/moral-overload/ [https://perma.cc/E2VY-RD5D].
Id.
See JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE
LIMITS OF PRIVACY 19-20 (2001). Gillom identifies the central force behind welfare
surveillance to detect fraud and unreported earned income as “the ‘means test’ which
consists of some mechanism for determining if someone is eligible by assessing their
needs, their resources, or their capacity to work” and that such focus on surveillance
“reflect[s] both our faith in the importance of labor and our suspicion that people will
do nearly anything to avoid it.” Id.
See Mead, supra note 52.
See Failinger, supra note 9, at 214–15, 229.
Id. at 213, 225–26.
Id. at 218.
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give rise, in modern workfare regimes, to expressions of work as
punishment for failure,59 work as medicine for physical or mental
deficiency,60 and work as payback for financial need.61 Such
obligations can only be excused for limited reasons characterized as
personal defects deserving of economic sanction.62 In addition,
workfare depends on “[t]he [h]ypocrisy of [p]rogress,”63 which
credits individuals for upward economic mobility buoyed by social
support, yet punishes individuals when it is societal support that is
lacking, in the form of educational access, job security, or protection
against discrimination or intimate partner violence.64 In line with
“the deeply held Western view of time as progressive, rather than
cyclical or episodic,” individuals never merit relief for delays,
interruptions, or backsliding from the elusive goal of financial
independence—whatever the reason.65
In addition to implementing a punitive philosophy, the recent
history of social welfare in the United States is one of abdication of
responsibility for structural economic inequality and disparities based
on race, gender, geography, and other divides.66 As David Super has
documented, welfare administration has long been subject to various
forms of decentralization and devolution67: (1) to states, which retain
authority to determine minimum benefit levels and eligibility criteria;
(2) to government officials and agency caseworkers, who retain
discretion to prioritize efficiency over equity; (3) to private actors,
who have financial incentives to partner with agencies to provide
public services with little accountability;68 and finally, (4) to
automated systems driven by artificial intelligence, which can permit
little human intervention, or worse, import human biases and
prejudices into algorithms with a life of their own.69 As a result, the

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 225.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 230.
See id. at 221–22.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 222–24.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 216–18.
See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and
the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 545–46 (2008) (criticizing
how decentralized decision making has negatively impacted antipoverty law).
See id. at 547.
See CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 5–9, 12–13 (2016) (discussing how lack of
regulation and challenge to current algorithms has reinforced discrimination).
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system permits and perpetuates abuses of power without meaningful
public oversight.70
In theory, welfare administration could be an opportunity for
“democratic experimentalism,” as the resulting hybrid schemes
between public and private, market-based and philanthropic, and
federal and local entities can promote innovation by a range of
stakeholders.71 Yet, Super notes that people living in poverty and
struggling to survive on a daily basis may be the least able to engage
in the governmental decisions that directly impact their lives in
regular and meaningful ways, and are thus left out of the process.72
Dean Spade and other advocates of mutual aid see opportunities for
community members to voluntarily organize themselves and provide
for material needs of members through non-hierarchical networks
based on reciprocal social provision and participatory
decisionmaking for collective action.73 When “real material needs”
are effectively met, substantial commitment to sharing power in
communities through such networks can, as organizer Mariame Kaba
puts it, “build the relationships that are needed to push back on the
state.”74 Community organizing in this vein could work either
alongside formal government or independent of the subordinating
structures of either state or market-based systems, “in which wealth

70.
71.

72.

73.

74.

See id. at 138–41.
See, e.g., ZOE GANNON & NEAL LAWSON, CO-PRODUCTION: THE MODERNIZATION OF
PUBLIC SERVICES BY STAFF AND USERS 21–22 (2008), https://www.compassonline.org
.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/CO-PRODUCTION.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S5U-FQ
JR] (advocating for participatory co-production that would “creat[e] a new settlement
between government, workers and the people who use and need [public] services.”).
See Super, supra note 67, at 547; see also Bell et al., supra note 44, at 66 (“[W]elfare
policy most directly affects the poorest Americans, yet poor Americans have long had
virtually no power over the institutions and actors that make decisions about welfare
policy.”).
See Dean Spade, Solidarity Not Charity: Mutual Aid for Mobilization and Survival, 38
SOC. TEXT 131, 136–46 (2020). Spade calls for the creation of “horizontal,
participatory decision-making processes [that] . . . utilize consensus decision making
to cultivate meaningful collective control and present co-optation.” Id. at 144. See
also THE CARE COLLECTIVE, THE CARE MANIFESTO: THE POLITICS OF
INTERDEPENDENCE 46 (2020) (“[M]utual support, public space, shared resources and
local democracy” are four crucial features that “[c]aring communities need to be
strengthened, pluralized and diversified” and “which, brought together, form what we
call a ‘sharing infrastructure’ at community level.”).
Jia Tolentino, Can I Help You? The Meaning of Mutual Aid During a Pandemic, NEW
YORKER, May 18, 2020, at 24, 26.
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and resources are extracted and concentrated and most people can
survive only by participating in various extractive relationships.”75
Nonetheless, a strong governmental social safety net remains a
necessary pre-condition of any form of civic engagement.76 Amid
the explicit sexual regulation and implicit victim-blaming ideology
espoused by welfare reform that withholds state support, many
women and people of color are hard-pressed to find accessible spaces
in which their voices and choices can be heard and valued without
additional reciprocal obligations.77
The micromanagement of
women’s lives and those of their children threatens to keep them
trapped in systems that are not of their own making and difficult to
escape, even with empowering community care and support.78
Lucie White’s reflection on the experience of a composite client,
Mrs. G., highlights the transitory power of defiance against
governmental accusations of fraud and mismanagement of meager
public benefits to stave off the invasive and punitive welfare system,
with its far-reaching control of women’s daily lives and
decisionmaking for their own families.79 Rather than humble herself
to the level of welfare agency rules that permit spending on necessary
items only, a mother defiantly and proudly announces she has spent
money received from the settlement of a lawsuit to purchase not bare
essentials, but the luxury of Sunday shoes for her children.80 In so
doing, she simultaneously redefines need and necessary living
expenses on her own terms and displays her household spending to
all without shame.81 Indeed, following the standard rules requires
exposing personal and financial choices to scrutiny.82 For example,
Mrs. G’s own attorney casually and routinely assumes that Mrs. G.
75.

76.
77.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Spade, supra note 73, at 136. In Spade’s conception, “mutual aid is an often devalued
iteration of radical collective care that provides a transformative alternative” that
would not just reform but “dismantle” systems that inhibit collective selfdetermination. Id. at 131, 133. Instead, proponents of mutual aid driven by
“solidarity not charity” seek systems of material aid “controlled by the people who
use it.” Id. at 135.
See Johnathan Conning & Michael Kevane, Community-Based Targeting Mechanisms
for Social Safety Nets: A Critical Review, 30 WORLD DEV. 375, 375–76 (2002).
See Bell et al., supra note 44, at 67 (“The problem of legal estrangement – a process
by which institutions signal to poor people that they are outsiders within their own
nation – also chills their democratic participation.”).
See id. at 40–42.
Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 48 (1990).
See id. at 31.
See id. at 48–51.
See id. at 30–31 (highlighting scrutiny of personal finances as proof of benefit
eligibility during a welfare hearing).
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can and will bring in actual pairs of her children’s delapidated shoes
as evidence of her impoverished and destitute situation, rather than
letting her own truth-telling testimony speak for itself.83
Mrs. G’s considerable dependence on the discretion of government
actors, who retain the authority to bestow or withhold crucial
assistance at will, requires conformity and leaves her perpetually
uncertain about her chances for a favorable outcome in any given
conflict or dispute with the welfare agency.84 In this setting, Mrs.
G’s intervention on her own behalf is limited to acquiescence,
supplication, or a limited form of resistance only in the moment,
before she is subject to subordination once again.85 Mrs. G’s story
powerfully captures the routine disempowerment that the welfare
system enacts on families—and their advocates—as a condition of
receiving basic subsistence assistance that a humane society owes its
citizens, without questions asked.86 The level of discipline and
punishment involved in endlessly justifying one’s deservingness of
social support is excessive and intrusive.87 In order to receive basic
benefits for survival, the poor give up their right to be left alone,88
and the burden falls mainly on the shoulders of Black single
mothers.89
One condition of government assistance is acceptance of the first
job available, at whatever wage, and under any work conditions.90
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

89.

90.

See id. at 30.
See generally id. at 22–30.
See id. at 31–32.
See generally id. at 32–44.
See id.
Khiara Bridges makes the compelling argument that Black women and poor women
have been entirely “dispossessed of privacy rights; they are not bearers of privacy
rights.” KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 11 (2017); see Mink,
supra note 18, at 80 (TANF “disciplines recipients by either stealing or impairing
their basic rights.”); see also GILLIOM, supra note 54, at 125 (recognizing that
“‘[p]rivacy’ is a very important and meaningful thing to lots of people,” but is
underenforced, particularly for the poor).
GILLIOM, supra note 54, at 27 (stating the federal welfare program’s “emphasis on the
individual determination of need, frequent reporting, and ongoing determinations of
‘worthiness,’ is driven to engage in some of the most invasive forms of scrutiny
imaginable[,]” and that such programs “are also tied to the fact that they deal with
those who would be considered society’s least powerful¾poor, often minority,
women and children.”).
FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 12–14 (2d ed. 1993); see also William P. Quigley,
Backwards into the Future: How Welfare Changes in the Millennium Resemble
English Poor Law of the Middle Ages, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 101, 102 (1998); see
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The benefits system also requires applicants to exhaust existing
resources before authorizing public assistance.91 The additional
requirement that single parents cooperate with child support
enforcement against the noncustodial parent, or risk reduction of
benefits as a sanction, pushes such a philosophy to extremes; it does
so even where custodial parents—disproportionately mothers—have
good reasons not to upset a delicate existing balance of in-kind
support or voluntary childcare arrangements that coercive economic
sanctions would endanger.92 Receipt of subsistence benefits thus
requires the surrender of “vocational freedom, sexual privacy, and
reproductive choice, as well as the right to make intimate decisions
about how to be and raise a family.”93 This system regulates
women’s fertility, relationships with absent fathers, relationships to
the job market, and relationships to agency caseworkers who have
the authority to withhold essential assistance.94 It permits intrusions
where households fail to conform to the accepted model that
privileges households with a male provider, and normalizes intrusion
and invasion into the privacy of only some households.95
The invasive welfare regime enacts surveillance and punishment as
a vestige of patriarchal, racist, and capitalist control of women’s
bodies and reproductive capabilities, binding them in dependence on
state assistance in the absence of a male breadwinner.96 As Anna
Marie Smith recounts, PRWORA enacted a regime of regulation and
control of poor women’s fertility and sexual freedom that more
economically secure women do not face.97 She examines the sexual
regulation of women through welfare policies controlling mandatory
abstinence education, sanctions for “noncooperation” with child
support enforcement, and family cap policies limiting assistance

91.
92.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

also Michele Estrin Gilman, Welfare, Privacy, and Feminism, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 3–5
(2008).
See Quigley, supra note 90, at 102.
See Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best
Interests of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1029, 1029 (2007) (“Fragile relationships between mothers, fathers, and children are
often broken. . . . And the social fabric is torn as significant numbers of welfare
fathers retreat from the workforce and their families.”).
Mink, supra note 18, at 79.
Id. at 81 (“[T]he TANF regime treats wage work as the alternative to marriage, not to
welfare—as punishment for mothers’ independence.”).
See Gilman, supra note 90, at 2.
See Randy Albelda, Fallacies of Welfare-to-Work Policies, in LOST GROUND:
WELFARE REFORM, POVERTY AND BEYOND 79, 88‒90 (Albelda & Withorn eds., 2002).
Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary Welfare Law:
A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 144–45 (2002).
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regardless of the number of children in the household, finding
disparate exposure to invasions of privacy at every turn.98 “In
essence, every mother who wishes to freely determine the structure
of her childbearing and household must not only secure the
cooperation of the biological father; she must also be wealthy enough
to purchase, in effect, governmental respect for her autonomy.”99
White’s analysis of Mrs. G’s administrative welfare hearing lays
bare both the possibilities and limits of a context in which a welfare
recipient and her entire experience of intimidation, humiliation, and
objectification culminate in a few minutes of rebellion, defiance, and
reclamation in front of institutional actors who may or may not fully
receive the message.100 Regardless of the power of her declaration in
the moment, “it was an act that did little to change the harsh
landscape which constricts Mrs. G. from more sustained and more
effective political participation. Substantial change in that landscape
will come only as such fragile moments of dignity are supported and
validated by the law.”101 White acknowledges that this form of
resistance is limited without the substantive legal changes that would
transform the punitive system into a supportive one; a new system
that would restore entitlement to social support as the norm, rather
than as a devalued alternative to the patriarchal model favoring a
male breadwinner supported by a female caregiver and reproducer of
labor.102
Essential for upholding neoliberal and patriarchal dichotomies
between private and public forms of social support is the failure to
value carework in the home and the need for low-wage workers in
the labor market.103 The stigma attached to benefit receipt and
poverty more generally derives from expectations of male
breadwinners as heads of traditional heterosexual nuclear households
and women’s roles as uncompensated caregivers in the home.104 At
the same time, regulation of the labor market to keep wages low and
labor supplies dependent on employers has limited women in their
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

104.

Id. at 140.
Id.; see also Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77
BROOK. L. REV. 1389, 1406 (2012).
See White, supra note 79, at 32–33.
Id. at 52; see also Gilman, supra note 99, at 1442.
See White, supra note 79, at 53–54.
See Cammett, supra note 42, at 374 (describing criminalization of low-income, Black
working mothers who may rely on community support provided in the form of
informal, uncompensated childcare).
See Albelda, supra note 96, at 91 (“For some families having the sole adult in the
labor force is not always possible or desirable.”).
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ability to fill jobs typically reserved for males, and has limited the
wages available for women to be heads of their own households
without men.105 The ideal of marriage with women in the home—
versus single women in the labor market—enforces patriarchal
dependence on men to a damaging degree, particularly where
intimate partner violence may occur.106 Strict definitions of such
violence also limit who can claim good cause to be excused from
application of the most punitive and invasive rules.107 Within this
system, according to the market discipline of workfare, opportunities
for impacted individuals to have a voice and a life outside its control
are scarce.108
Of course, federal constitutional protections have nothing to say
beyond offering the most minimal due process protections,109 with
any protection beyond the minimum depending in part on a kind of
cost-benefit analysis that favors efficiency overall.110 The bruising
rollbacks enacted by welfare reform in 1996 show a glaring need for
restored federal government oversight and strong legal protections
for those in need of social support.111 Even with minimal due
105. Mink, supra note 18, at 81.
106. Id. (“Far from ‘ending dependency,’ the TANF regime actually favors poor mothers’
dependence on individual men.”).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (2018); 45 C.F.R. §§ 260.50–.59 (2019) (stating the option to
create special programs that permit domestic violence survivors to waive certain
workfare requirements).
108. See Bell et al., supra note 44, at 65.
For roughly one decade in welfare’s 73-year history, welfare
recipients were part of a movement [the National Welfare Rights
Organization] that shaped the national agenda and pushed against
the dehumanization of welfare recipients. Since the demise of the
welfare rights movement, families who rely on welfare have
become faceless, nameless and, too often, mired in shame.
Id.
109. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (stating “the Constitution does not
provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill[,]” such as accrual of debt
for uninhabitable residence); see also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972)
(“[T]he [state] legislature’s efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy
are not subject to a constitutional straitjacket.”); see also Bell et al., supra note 44, at
48-49 (discussing “tentative” Supreme Court support for “a somewhat more
nationally standardized approach to [welfare] during the 1960s and 1970s.”) (footnote
omitted).
110. See Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law,
Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 670 (2008); see
also Gilman, supra note 99, at 1444–45.
111. See Nice, supra note 110, at 633–36.
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process protections of notice and an opportunity to be heard, without
actual outcomes that guarantee assistance—and some measure of
autonomy—the system remains a harsh gatekeeper that exacts high
costs deemed appropriate to achieve the goal of excluding all but the
most desperate and willing to abide by harsh rules.112
Relational models that explicitly seek to return human relationships
to social welfare provision are among the new models of welfare that
have been proposed or piloted as an alternative to the punitive,
bureaucratic, and dehumanizing workfare system.113
While
alternative models hold promise for blunting the harsh work ideology
that exposes women¾disproportionately women of color¾to stigma
based on their sexual and family relationships and labor market
choices, without additional safeguards, women may be unable to
transcend the dichotomy of labor market and family relations, the
inevitability of state intrusion into social support, or the potential
abuses of power these issues permit and perpetuate.114
II. RESTORING THE SAFETY NET FOR SANCTIONS:
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
PUNITIVE WORKFARE
A. Choosing Relationships Over Retribution
Restorative justice advocates have made inroads into entrenched
systems of mass incarceration and overcriminalization that operate
disproportionately as mechanisms of behavioral control in urban,
low-income, and predominately Black communities.115 By shifting
112. See Gilman, supra note 99, at 1390–93, 1397–98, 1410–12.
113. See Failinger, supra note 9, at 234–40; see also Cottam, Relational Welfare, supra
note 28, at 136–41.
114. See discussion infra Part IV.
115. See Julie Goldscheid, #MeToo, Sexual Harassment and Accountability: Considering
the Role of Restorative Approaches, OHIO STATE J. DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 15–16). Some version of restorative justice—including more broadly
transformative justice—may be a component of broader calls for prison abolition and
decriminalization in light of the failure of retributive criminal legal systems to realize
public safety. See, e.g., I. Bennet Capers, Afrofuturism, Critical Race Theory, and
Policing in the Year 2044, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 56 (2019) (imagining a future in
which majority-minority population creates conditions rendering crimes of violence
“relatively rare” and punishable by “treatment and therapy to work through anger
issues, as well as restorative justice, perhaps in the form of sessions with survivors of
the victim.”); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism,
133 HARV. L. REV. 3, 46 (2019) (“Rejecting the carceral paradigm, black feminist
abolitionists have proposed community-based transformative justice responses that
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the criminal legal system’s focus and funding from retributive
punishment to restoration of the community bonds that are broken by
harmful conduct, restorative justice circles and similar processes seek
to hold individuals accountable for their behavior, while also
providing community support to manage the external forces that can
influence individual decisions or motivations.116 Instead of, for
example, depriving whole neighborhoods of potentially productive
residents through prolonged mass incarceration, restorative justice
would use the power of human relationships to foster dialogue and
ongoing engagement with individuals accused of violating
community norms, thereby reshaping social interactions to build
stronger, safer communities with more empowered and engaged
members.117 As an alternative to harsh punishment for past wrongs
meted out through retributive justice channels, restorative justice
offers a more forward-looking bridge between socially disconnected
individuals and the communities that surround them,118 and balances
the goal of fostering personal accountability against the goal of
providing community support to individuals so that they may thrive
in society and support others.119
Restorative justice is used in contexts ranging from juvenile
offenses to intimate partner violence to other violent offenses.120
Restorative justice circles traditionally take place as regular, nonhierarchical gatherings involving different community stakeholders,
at which everyone affected by an individual’s behavior is empowered

116.

117.
118.
119.

120.

address the social causes of violence and hold people accountable without exposing
them to police violence and state incarceration.”).
See Goldscheid, supra note 115 (manuscript at 22) (“Some commentators endeavor to
synthesize the various benefits and risks of restorative approaches and urge an
integrated, multi-perspective and context-dependent approach to developing
strategies. They argue that critics of restorative justice often incorrectly assume that
the current system keeps women safe, which it does not.”).
See id. (manuscript at 15–18).
See Failinger, supra note 9, at 234–40.
Id. at 324–42; see generally Goldscheid, supra note 115 (manuscript at 15–24)
(defining restorative practices and discussing feminist debates about application of
restorative justice to gender violence).
Charisa Smith, Nothing About Us Without Us! The Failure of the Modern Juvenile
Justice System and a Call for Community-Based Justice, 4 J. APPLIED RSCH. ON
CHILD., no. 1, 2013, at 1, 20–23; Leigh Goodmark, Stop Treating Domestic Violence
Differently from Other Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/07/23/opinion/domestic-violence-criminal-justice-reform-too.html [https://
perma.cc/JK3M-9SA5]; see, e.g., Charisa Klyö Smith, #WhoAmI?: Harm & Remedy
for Youth of the #MeToo Era, 23 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 47–55).
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to speak candidly without fear of reprisals or repercussions.121
Crucially, participation in restorative justice is voluntary and
decoupled from negative consequences, although it usually occurs in
the shadow of harsher enforcement mechanisms.122
While
punishment may remain as an ultimate option, the focus has shifted
away from individual retribution and stigmatization towards restoring
and strengthening bonds of trust and mutual reliance for the future.123
As Marie Failinger observes, “restorative systems put significant
weight on the interdependence of the community and individual in
the circle, and the acceptance of responsibility by both for the
other.”124 Restorative justice thus retains an emphasis on personal
accountability while also recognizing society’s obligations to
individual members, and removes the harshest consequences for
failure to uphold one’s end of the bargain, at least until all
alternatives have been exhausted.125
Extended beyond the criminal or juvenile legal systems, restorative
justice may seem ripe for application to the workfare context,
designed as it is to provide or withhold basic cash assistance based on
moral desert.126 Faced with a host of complicated and strict rules
intended to weed out undeserving claims—for example, due to
untapped family resources, unreported income, or failure to accept
the first available job regardless of pay or conditions—individuals in
need risk appearing deficient at best and, at worst, deceitful.127
Failinger argues that the existing system, which builds “work
programs on paradigms that punish recipients, treat[s] them as
diseases upon the body politic, or send[s] forth a multitude of unclear
expectations about what a recipient ‘owes’ the public for support [is]
ultimately self-defeating.”128 Restorative justice aims to achieve
121. See Goldscheid, supra note 115 (manuscript at 18) (“[R]estorative practices invite
empathy, responsibility and truth telling; by contrast, legal proceedings, whether civil
or criminal, dis-incentivize truth telling because those who committed harm know
they will be punished or subject to liability if they admit what happened.”).
122. See id. (“[S]ome [restorative justice] proponents believe that for it to be effective, it
must remain outside the purview of courts or other punishment-oriented systems.”).
123. See id. (manuscript at 15–19).
124. Failinger, supra note 9, at 239.
125. See id. at 239–40.
126. See id. at 211–12.
127. See id. at 218–21, 231; see generally Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of
Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 644–51, 653–55 (2009) (exploring direct
links between welfare programs and criminal prosecution for fraud or related program
violations).
128. Failinger, supra note 9, at 242.
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more than punishment for past wrongs, but also behavioral change as
a mutual obligation between society and individuals to maximize the
public good.129 Restorative justice has important lessons for the
workfare regime that governs the poor and punishes—through
reduction of the very financial support needed for subsistence—those
who are financially needy, but may fail to comply with onerous work
or financial eligibility requirements without legally or socially
acceptable reasons.130
Failinger imagines the extension of restorative justice principles to
the workfare context in her recounting of a hypothetical “experience
of a welfare client with limited work skills who is referred to a
restorative justice circle as part of a welfare-to-work program.”131 In
contrast to the scenario facing Mrs. G. in an administrative hearing
before a stranger authorized to hold her benefits hostage for bad
behavior,132 in Failinger’s imagined scenario, “Janice, twenty-one
years old and the mother of two young children, enters a large room,
only to be greeted and hugged by two of the members of her
restorative justice circle.”133 The participants maintain an emotional
bond that is neither focused on assigning blame nor merely
transactional.134 Throughout the course of the session, Janice
recounts her struggles with juggling the demands and uncertainties of
a new job, childcare, and her own need for adult social
interactions.135 When she acknowledges that late nights out with
friends may be affecting her job performance or childcare
arrangements, the circle members respectfully, but directly, test
Janice’s decisionmaking assumptions and possibly wishful
thinking.136
In a more formal welfare agency hearing, Janice’s circumstances
might be found insufficient to excuse tardiness at work and could
result in a welfare sanction and loss of subsistence benefits for
noncompliance with work requirements.137 By contrast, at the end of
the restorative circle meeting, although the participants do not
pronounce success or resolution, they take affirmative steps to
address Janice’s self-identified challenges by offering assistance with
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See supra text accompanying notes 115–25.
See Failinger, supra note 9, at 216, 218–24, 227, 231.
Id. at 234.
See supra text accompanying notes 79–89.
Failinger, supra note 9, at 234.
See id. at 234–36.
Id. at 235.
See id. at 235–36.
Id. at 226–27.
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some of her daily struggles—e.g., obtaining childcare on weekend
evenings—and then schedule the next circle.138 Deliberate dialogue
and reflection in a circle without judgment or excuses thus can result
in practical interventions to challenges “tackled by circle members in
partnership with the recipient, neither solving her problems for her
nor expecting her to solve them by herself.”139
In the welfare context, restorative justice can focus on better
processes and more humane interactions over faceless and remote
government bureaucracy on the one hand, and abandonment to and
dependence on unaccountable, unsupportive, and even potentially
abusive private relationships on the other.140 A restorative justice
system could surround a participant struggling to comply with
welfare program rules—including, for example, cooperation with
child support enforcement that could escalate family violence—with
a support network of community members who would hold her to her
own priorities, commitments, and aspirations in a more mutually
reinforcing process.141 A regularly occurring restorative justice circle
would effectively assist a participant in an ongoing, individualized
balancing of her own expressed needs, resources, and struggles—
e.g., maintaining their own boundaries for safe contact with a noncustodial parent—assisting where possible and challenging her when
warranted.142 “[R]estorative justice offers practical processes that
actually account for the complexity in a welfare recipient’s situation,
behaviors, and character.”143 Such processes are mechanisms not
seen in “legalized benefit programs with standardized work rules and
other sanctionable compliance mechanisms.”144
As Failinger’s entirely plausible scenario illustrates, restorative
justice alters many of the assumptions that underlie traditionally
punitive and compliance-focused workfare schemes.145 First, instead
of insisting on conformity with patriarchal and market-based models
for organizing family and work relationships—in which selfsufficiency and self-actualization require timely attainment of the
universal goals of marriage or paid work—restorative justice eschews
the expectation of regular and unwavering linear progress towards
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 236.
Id. at 242.
See infra notes 141–61 and accompanying text.
See Failinger, supra note 9, at 234–36.
Id. at 238.
Id.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 212.
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any fixed, readily identifiable target.146 Restorative justice is “at
once optimistic—it assumes that people really make changes in their
behavior and patterns of life choices—and realistic—it does not
assume that this change is easy or that it is simply a matter of
education or a ‘will to change.’”147 Outcomes for human experiences
cannot be measured in linear fashion.148 Accordingly, “[r]estorative
justice anticipates a bumpy trajectory that may involve some reverses
and stalls in the recipient’s move toward her goals for her family.”149
In addition, instead of advancing a static conception of “financial
independence” as measured by formulaic cost-benefit analysis,
restorative justice countenances intangible, unquantifiable factors
that add value to the human experience of interdependence.150 The
restorative justice model does not seek to primarily maximize
efficiencies or improve short-term outcomes as explicit goals.151 In
addition, it does not count reduced incidents of noncompliance, but
instead tracks increased strength of relationships.152 In this way, it
measures factors other than efficiency and recidivism, potentially
registering qualitative and intangible factors such as satisfaction,
interest, or trust.153 Indeed, this is in contrast to the idea of a social
contract underlying workfare, in which everyone must fulfill strict
work requirements in exchange for subsistence income.154
Restorative justice has been described as an explicit “wager” that
communities make on the social commitment of their individual
members; however, it is more than a cold calculation based on
probabilistic chance.155 Rather, societies can choose to invest in their
members unconditionally, based on human dignity rather than
perceived deficits, and pool their risk in recognition of the
misfortunes and mistakes that can derail even the best bets.156 The
key distinction is that restorative justice does not quantify the relative
obligations of individuals and their communities, and thus precludes
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See id. at 238.
Id. at 237.
See id. at 223.
Id. at 242.
See id. at 237.
See id. at 242–43.
See id. at 239–40.
See id. at 239.
See infra notes 155–57 and accompanying text.
See Marie A. Failinger, Ophelia with Child: A Restorative Approach to Legal
Decision-Making by Teen Mothers, 28 L. & INEQ., 255, 280–81 (2010).
156. See Failinger, supra note 9, at 239 (“[R]estorative systems put significant weight on
the interdependence of the community and the individual in the circle, and the
acceptance of responsibility by both for the other.”).

2021]

Reimagining Welfare-to-Work

309

the conclusion that anyone “owes” a debt to another, but at the same
time takes mutuality of obligation in society into account as its own
value.157
Finally, restorative justice, by its nature, embodies an iterative
process that can adapt to ever-changing, indeterminate individual and
community needs and hopes.158 What may make sense for one
individual at one time may be utterly ineffective or impossible for
another individual or another time.159 As Failinger explains,
“[b]ecause restorative processes are focused on past, present and
future, the drive toward ensuring that individuals are always
‘progressing’ along a scale to some desired level of economic,
psychological and social self-sufficiency will be muted to a large
extent.”160 Instead, “the restorative paradigm offers appropriate
processes for the recipient to be accountable in a realistic way,
factoring in limitations and modifying goals in a flexible manner
which traditional welfare work programs, with their rigid ‘objective’
criteria and time limitations, cannot possibly achieve.”161
This flexibility and the lack of tangible outcome measures pegged
to linear progress milestones may make systemic reform of punitive
workfare difficult beyond altering the process used for resolving
individual conflicts or disputes about who is ready, willing, or able to
work.162 Nevertheless, so long as the workfare scheme remains
focused on individual failings or desert, even small procedural
reforms can improve experiences for many individuals whom society
could better support and protect from destitution.163 Even as
relational approaches such as restorative justice reveal the reality of
human interdependence and expose the myth of autonomy or selfsufficiency, minimal safety net and procedural protections remain
essential to guard against further denigration of those who find

157. See Nicole Concordia, Preserving Liberty in the American Justice System Through
Circle Processes, U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Spring 2011, at 67, 76.
158. See Laurie S. Kohn, What’s So Funny About Peace, Love, and Understanding?
Restorative Justice as a New Paradigm for Domestic Violence Intervention, 40 SETON
HALL L. REV. 517, 570 (2010) (“A restorative justice session can adapt to the needs of
the parties involved.”).
159. See id.
160. Failinger, supra note 9, at 242.
161. Id. at 239.
162. See id. at 226–27.
163. See id. at 225–26 (describing implication that workfare recipients are not equally
deserving of employment opportunities because of their prior failures).
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themselves on the undeserving side of the workfare equation and still
subject to its unforgiving demands.164
B. The Long Shadow of Sanctions
Restorative justice is positioned and interposed as a kinder, gentler
form of dispute resolution.165 Failinger envisions an alternative to
punishment that would accomplish the dual goals of supporting
participants while promoting accountability on a voluntary basis to
foster greater self-determination.166 Failinger explains that:
The goal of the restorative process is not punishment for bad
behavior, nor is it to provide a convenient excuse for
workers who have failed to live up to others’ expectations.
Rather, it is to hold the recipient accountable to her own self
and goals with appropriate regard for unforeseen obstacles
she may have encountered that have thwarted her ability to
meet her own expectations.167
Yet the restorative process still assumes the existence of disputes
arising within a compliance enforcement system in which fault,
liability, accountability, and responsibility are assigned against the
individual for diffuse harms to society resulting from a failure to
abide by its rules.168 For example, individual decisions to decline
employment for unacceptable reasons (e.g., an excessive commute,
perhaps, or lack of career advancement opportunities) or to engage in
creative household accounting deemed to be “mismanagement of
funds,” continue to subject welfare recipients to sanctions for
decisions other workers or consumers routinely make without
consequence.169 Even with restorative justice available as an
alternative, scrutiny of everyday work-life decisions as a condition of
receiving subsistence benefits remains a burden for welfare recipients
that the general public does not share.170

164. See supra notes 25–27, 44–49 and accompanying text.
165. See Maggie T. Grace, Criminal Alternative Dispute Resolution: Restoring Justice,
Respecting Responsibility, and Renewing Public Norms, 34 VT. L. REV. 563, 589
(2010) (juxtaposing restorative justice concepts against traditional punitive
punishment dispute resolution).
166. See infra text accompanying notes 167–70.
167. Failinger, supra note 9, at 239.
168. See id. (alluding to desire of a compliance enforcement system to exert power over
offenders to maintain social order).
169. See id. at 226–27.
170. Id.
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Under workfare ideology, those who do not or cannot comply, but
choose not to engage in restorative justice processes, remain subject
to a punitive compliance mechanism.171 In this way, restorative
justice remains a system of discipline.172 As Failinger observes,
restorative justice is designed to preclude participants from
“rationaliz[ing] (sometimes even justly) behavior that does not
cooperate with the demands of the welfare system and is not in the
best interests of their family,” as defined by the state.173 Restorative
justice circles may serve only as a safety valve in an unjust system—
through which individuals beaten down by the unreasonable
constraints and rules of profit maximization can gain some measure
of individualized relief, understanding, or compassion—but true
repair of dignitary harm remains elusive.174 In a restorative justice
system, emotions such as insolence or anger directed at a harsh
workfare regime may count for little unless they can move the
community forward toward strength.175 Instead, to a degree,
participants in restorative justice circles must embrace “internal
change” and avoid a “victim mentality.”176 Perhaps this is the price
for the culture change needed to turn political support away from
punishment and back towards entitlement based on human dignity.177
Ultimately, however, the model may not be radical but merely reflect
societal norms as they currently exist.178
Indeed, Failinger
acknowledges that “restorative circle participants bring with them the
core values that we may expect those in the market economy to
embrace and participate with welfare recipients in living out those
values.”179 As Dean Spade concludes, and the unprecedented
unemployment crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic confirms, such
expectations merely reinforce the characterization of “people who

171. See Noah D. Zatz, Poverty Unmodified?: Critical Reflections on the
Deserving/Undeserving Distinction, 59 UCLA L. REV. 550, 556–57 (2012) (arguing
for expanded eligibility and definition of need in a less punitive welfare system).
172. See id.
173. Failinger, supra note 9, at 239.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. Id. at 238.
177. See Amy J. Cohen, Moral Restorative Justice: A Political Genealogy of Activism and
Neoliberalism in the United States, 104 MINN. L. REV. 889, 892–93 (2019) (noting
restorative justice is gaining political support in both national and state institutions).
178. Failinger, supra note 9, at 242.
179. Id.; see also Gilman, supra note 99, at 1442.
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were already displaced by the ordinary disasters of capitalism [as]
blameworthy.”180
By contrast, what may truly be needed is a way to redefine
“compliance” to account for realities of life and lived experiences
that depart from market norms and values that privilege rational costbenefit analysis for decisionmaking.181 Numerous studies warn
against assuming that human beings may be simplistically influenced
in their behavior by sticks or carrots—or solely responsible for the
outcomes, whether good or bad.182 Likewise, the expectation that
participants can self-define their own goals in restorative circles may
presuppose a level of rational decisionmaking divorced from
cognitive bias or emotional investment that few truly possess.183
The decision to participate in restorative justice itself may be less
than fully autonomous, even if rational.184 Rather than mandate
participation, as is the case with many forms of alternative dispute
resolution,185 restorative justice processes must be voluntary and not
coerced, which seems nearly impossible when basic subsistence or
family preservation may be at stake.186 Even as a fully voluntary
process, restorative justice requires transparency so that potential
participants may assess its value for their own unique, individual
circumstances.187 What might such a process offer to someone like
Mrs. G., whose experience with government-administered assistance
involves only hierarchical processes and arbitrary exercises of agency
discretion, even when occasionally applied in her favor for unknown
and unpredictable reasons?188
Restorative justice is also
discretionary and individualized, which might more reliably offer
solutions and support in Mrs. G.’s favor, particularly where her own
involvement and voice are central and amplified.189 Perhaps
180. Spade, supra note 73, at 141.
181. Mink, supra note 18, at 88 (“The main reasons for the persistence of poverty among
former TANF recipients is that they are moving primarily into low-wage and
contingent jobs without benefits, losing access to food stamps and Medicaid, and
surrendering as much as 25 percent of their paychecks to child care.”).
182. See, e.g., Esther Duflo & Abhijit Banerjee, Economic Incentives Don’t Always Do
What We Want Them To, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/10/26/opinion/sunday/duflo-banerjee-economic-incentives.html [https://pe
rma.cc/RAB3-JBXN].
183. Failinger, supra note 9, at 237.
184. See id. at 238.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 79–89.
189. See White, supra note 79, at 52–53.
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disapprobation could be replaced by compassion and
understanding.190 But the potential for broader legal change beyond
her individual circumstances remains limited.191 Precisely because
the stakes are lowered, the power of Mrs. G’s voice and defiance may
be diluted¾perhaps in exchange for a better individual experience
and safer space¾but with less urgency to expand minimal
protections for all.192
In addition, the restorative justice process may involve disclosure
of private information, including confessions of personal
transgressions, which one might ordinarily and quite reasonably want
to keep secret from neighbors, community members, or even close
friends.193 Intrusions on privacy—as personal details are freely
discussed by restorative justice circle members—may be tolerated as
a condition of participation on the ground that the process itself
cannot result in loss of benefits to promote candid self-reflection
without fear of repercussions.194 Some measure of protection can
result from the involvement of multiple stakeholders to check
discretion or abuse on the part of other participants, especially if all
stakeholders are invested in the outcome without conflicts of interest
tied to any external incentives.195 But restorative justice remains in
the shadow of greater punishment or coercive effects, should
restorative processes fail to repair harm.196
Also left unspecified is what society, through its system of
government, owes to its neediest members as individuals or as a
group. What would it look like to hold government officials
accountable to individuals by calling them into a restorative circle or
hearing in front of the people most directly affected by their actions
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See id. at 52.
See supra text accompanying notes 79–89.
See supra text accompanying notes 79–89.
See Failinger, supra note 9, at 240–41.
See id.
Id. at 242.
[T]he more public nature of the circle—with its checks and
balances coming from the open discussion among members who
have different reasons for being in the circle, who represent
different views of the community’s expectations for the
recipient—make it much less likely that a single professional
worker can abuse a recipient in the process of the exercise of
discretion.

Id.
196. Id. at 239.
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or failures to act? In a public hearing, a government representative
may not be the person who actually took the action or had knowledge
of the individual case.197 High caseloads may prevent government
case workers from obtaining actual knowledge or details about the
people involved, or worse, permit abuse of discretion on the basis of
administratively expedient proxies and prejudices.198 Without some
assurance against adverse consequences, government representatives
have no incentive to voluntarily take responsibility for harms to
individual community members resulting in deprivation of needed
subsistence benefits.199 Still, the ongoing dialogue and mutual
accountability offered by restorative justice circles could consciously
include individual government actors with some degree of immunity,
and could go a long way toward fostering trust and a shared
commitment to problem-solving, rather than adversarial posturing
and coercion.200
Critics of restorative justice might well wonder whether it can ever
succeed in the absence of genuine choice or, alternatively, genuine
consequences for ongoing failures to uphold societal obligations to
individuals in need of support. Yet, in keeping with the view of
restorative justice as a wager—one society is bound to make—all
participants share the risk and must be genuinely willing both to
change behavior and to accept varying individual results, for good or
ill.201 At least as an alternative to the hard and fast, comply-or-else
sanction system—where barriers to self-sufficiency remain—
restorative justice circles formed on a voluntary basis could provide
the needed support system to facilitate more than just selfsufficiency, but genuine social contribution on an individual basis.202
Accordingly, restorative justice may hold some promise as a way of
recognizing, prioritizing, and centering the relationships between
individuals and society in dialogue and interactions that go above and
beyond the bare minimum.203
What restorative justice may not accomplish in individual circles,
however mutually supportive, is the elimination of systemic
problems that impact individuals and require law reform or political

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See id. at 242–43.
See id.
See id. at 218.
See id. at 242–43.
See supra text accompanying notes 151–57.
See supra text accompanying notes 121–24, 138–44.
See supra text accompanying notes 133–39, 141–42.
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change.204 Advocates might imagine scaling up restorative justice
circles to become larger group conflict-resolution strategies or
participatory decisionmaking processes in which all are empowered
to speak and act to strengthen the community and the welfare system
as a whole.205 But at least in a welfare system wedded to workfare
ideology, restorative justice may require further re-imagining and retooling to expand its impact beyond limited individual contexts.206
III. REVIVING RELATIONAL WORK: RADICAL HELP AS
VOLUNTARY AFFIRMATIVE SUPPORT
A. Harnessing Technology for Human Flourishing
Motivated by many of the same concerns highlighted by Failinger
and others in promoting more meaningful human relationships over
retributive justice,207 British design pioneer Hilary Cottam untethers
welfare provision entirely from its current bureaucratic moorings.208
Her work in this regard is a conscious and deliberate attempt to
remake a welfare system that takes little account of humans and has
thus arguably lost sight of its purpose.209 Explicitly justifying the
need for a new model due to a range of crises growing in urgency
since the 20th century, Cottam cites “[g]lobal warming, mass
migration, demographic changes, chronic disease epidemics,”
obesity, ageing, and globalized changes to work, “poverty and
inequality,” loneliness, and, at bottom, “a crisis of care[] [because]
[w]e cannot find ways to provide or pay for kind and human care.”210
The U.K. contexts in which Cottam operates range from unengaged
204. See Natalie Delgadillo, Restorative Justice Has the D.C. Attorney General’s Office
Looking at Prosecutions in a New Light, DCIST (May 8, 2020, 1:33 PM),
https://dcist.com/story/20/05/08/restorative-justice-has-the-d-c-attorney-generals-offic
e-looking-at-prosecutions-in-a-new-light/ [https://perma.cc/A2E9-AAKT] (discussing
the implementation of restorative justice approaches and categories of crimes and
conflicts with an inappropriate or an insufficient remedy).
205. See Failinger, supra note 9, at 212.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 44–55, 201–03.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 116–19, 123–25.
208. See COTTAM, RADICAL HELP, supra note 28, at 45–46.
209. See PARTICIPLE, BEVERIDGE 4.0 4–8 (2008), http://www.participle.net/includes
/downloader/MzExYWNjYWU3ZGZkMjQ5YmI0MjkxOTUxNGY2NzBmN2Fvy_B
kw5J5tvpI8s7ajaLKVGhIMHZCTHdsZGwzUGlQUmJYVzMrb0dFdmxBVDJwc3Bx
c2Y5dXEyRGg0OTA1VTkxT0VuVDhoV3FmZmFXYTNzN1IzR2dzRHRmNWorM
VZlQThPNUIvV0E9PQ [https://perma.cc/8HJ7-XZU6] (mission statement for group
seeking to reevaluate and reform the British welfare system).
210. COTTAM, RADICAL HELP, supra note 28, at 29.

316

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

youth, to retired seniors, to out-of-work adults, to families facing a
perfect storm of issues, and includes everything from eviction for
nonpayment of rent to child removal for abuse or neglect.211 While
none of these contexts entail an explicit workfare regime subject to
punitive sanction, each involves serious life issues exacerbated by
poverty and joblessness, triggering intensive interactions with
government authorities.212
Like Failinger’s restorative welfare model,213 Cottam’s relational
model is entirely voluntary, not punitive, involves no adverse
consequences, and aims to connect people who share affinities or
resources to cut through endless requirements, legal constraints, and
assumptions to help people help one other and themselves.214 Her
approach, recounted in her book Radical Help: How We Can Remake
the Relationships Between Us and Revolutionise the Welfare State,
does not view underemployed or disengaged individuals as deficient
or undeserving, but as full of untapped capabilities, which need to be
defined broadly, analyzed accurately, and activated through
connection with and support from others rather than through coercion
or punishment.215 Importantly, Cottam builds on a baseline of
minimal social protection as a safety net that the current U.S.
workfare regime shows no signs of guaranteeing.216
Informed by international micro-development lessons as well as by
design thinking, Cottam aims to harness resources and technology to
create hitherto nonexistent connections by engaging and empowering
a diverse range of stakeholders in a joint effort to break out of
bureaucratic constraints.217 Cottam lays out the philosophy behind
her design lab’s pilot programs that link individuals in need of social
supports to local community members—potentially even including
government workers—willing and able to provide such assistance.218
Whether actual human contact is the goal (as with linking the elderly
to community members for help with odd jobs around the house) or a
means to an end (e.g., using social networks based on shared goals
and experiences rather than centralized résumé banks to publicize
jobs and identify potential candidates), Cottam designs ways to bring
211. See id. at 29–35, 36–37.
212. See id. at 49, 281–82 n.1 (stating one family routinely had contact with more than
seventy different government workers over the course of their lives).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 131–44.
214. See COTTAM, RADICAL HELP, supra note 28, at 14–15, 18.
215. See id. at 114, 121–23.
216. See id. at 42–43.
217. See id. at 237–40.
218. See id. at 208.
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people together through stories, shared hobbies, interests, affinities,
and technology.219
Importantly, the programs target certain
populations, but also rely on others outside the target group to assist
and normalize the interactions.220 Based on her pilot program results,
bureaucratic solutions are a non-starter for assisting people with
some of the most intractable problems, like social isolation of the
elderly.221 For the elderly, “the practical support would need to be on
demand; the social connections would need to be authentic, and made
through shared interests, not a charitable wish to help another.”222
Cottam draws on the capability approach,223 which “grapples with
. . . knotty issues of power, access[,] and learnt norms of what is and
is not acceptable. It starts . . . by assuming agency, and that people
want to flourish.”224 She intends for her systems to be sustainable on
a modest scale, with buy-in from local governments and communities
that can build wide enough networks with the resources to expand
over space and time.225 “[O]ur ability to flourish depends on
marrying internal preparedness (for example feelings, knowledge[,]
and skills) with change in external realities (for example
environmental and social conditions and government policy).”226
Like restorative justice circles,227 Cottam’s pilot programs (one of
which is called “Circle”) rely on voluntary participation, nonlinear
progress, and deep inquiry into individual motives, assessments, and
capabilities.228 She aims to take “an approach that is rooted in
relationships and a broad understanding of capability [which] can
make a real difference—and can cost less.”229 Even if the cost were
high, however, Cottam argues that compared with the time and
money spent excluding people from assistance, the cost seems
justified.230
Using mobile apps and social media to bridge
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See id. at 205–09.
See id. at 206–07.
See id. at 170–73.
See id. at 221.
See Amartya Sen, Poor, Relatively Speaking, 35 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 153, 160
(1983), https://are.berkeley.edu/courses/ARE251/fall2008/Papers/sen83.pdf [https://
perma.cc/HU74-P29X]; see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental
Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, 9 FEMINIST ECON. 33, 33 (2003).
COTTAM, RADICAL HELP, supra note 28, at 202.
See Cottam, Relational Welfare, supra note 28, at 136–37.
COTTAM, RADICAL HELP, supra note 28, at 202.
See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., COTTAM, RADICAL HELP, supra note 28, at 179–80.
Id. at 136–37.
See id. at 14–15.
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geographic and social divides among people, while trusting in human
relationships to motivate and facilitate lasting individual capacity
building, Cottam envisions relational welfare as building on human
empathy and resilience; thus, relational welfare can improve the
quality and character of an individual’s life experiences, including
their interactions with government-funded support programs over
time.231
Cottam’s conception of “radical help” is a variation of “relational
welfare” that foregrounds individual relationships without assigning
responsibilities or liability, which is done to circumvent
administrative burdens and costs imposed under outdated systems
designed to manage scarce resources and meet quantitative data
outcomes.232 Cottam’s approach focuses on the individual in
relationship to others to weave genuine social bonds into a strong
safety net that effectively lays down new connections and bypasses
existing bureaucratic logjams.233 Indeed, measuring the success of
the new networks might depend on the vibrancy and frequency of
recourse to social relationships as resources, rather than
independence from social networks (or worse, exclusion from
societal resources altogether).234
For Cottam’s radical help, as with restorative justice, measurement
of outcomes relies not on linear or temporal data points, but includes
intangible measures such as personal satisfaction and outlook.235
“[M]any, if not most, people actually move backwards at the very
moment that they are really going forwards: the moment when we
really see the challenge and start to take action is frequently an
unstable one.”236 Her thoughtful experiments develop with
participants’ lives and feedback, in time to implement changes
without interrupting the momentum and good faith generated by upfront investment in relationships with total strangers.237
Cottam refuses to allow existing bureaucracy even to identify the
problems to be solved, instead inviting program participants to posit
their own personal goals and catalog their own strengths.238 The
differences between capabilities surfaced this way and those based in

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See id. at 184, 238–39, 254–55.
See Cottam, Relational Welfare, supra note 28, at 134.
See id. at 139–40.
See COTTAM, RADICAL HELP, supra note 28, at 197.
See id.
Id. at 261.
See id. at 273.
See id. at 269.
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conventional wisdom are striking.239 For example, to assist job
seekers, she invites participants to leave behind agency job bank
databases and even job coaching to engage in activities with people
who share similar backgrounds and goals, in order to let job
connections develop organically; this process offers more of a
restorative problem-solving circle for intensive, tailored, holistic
support, instead of piecemeal interactions with specialized
agencies.240
“Existing services categorise those out of work according to their
formal qualifications and the length of time they have been
unemployed. The lower the skill and the longer the time out of work,
the more dismal your chances are expected to be.”241 Yet Cottam
finds “no clear match” between these criteria and lack of “purpose
and motivation.”242 By contrast, she sorts individuals based on
“[w]hether participants had a dream of where they wanted to go, and
whether this dream was a place in which to hide or a glint of
something they really wanted to aim for, [as] a key differentiator.”243
In this process, success is measured not necessarily by achieving
one’s dream, but in taking steps toward that dream and voluntarily
accessing genuine support to assist people on the journey.244
B. Curbing Power in the Private Sphere
At the foundation of radical help is a refusal to settle for
bureaucracy.245 While “[b]ureaucracy and an arm’s length culture
can and have worked powerfully against prejudice,”246 focusing on
equal application of laws and supports, Cottam insists it is time for a
new approach, or perhaps a new look at an old approach.247 She
argues that social welfare pioneer William Beveridge’s
underappreciated “insight that solutions start with people and the
relationships between them marks the starting point of a potential
future path.”248 Concluding that bureaucracy impedes the human
tendency to collaborate with and support others, Cottam highlights
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See id. at 203–04.
See id. at 122–23, 130–31.
Id. at 231.
See id. at 233.
See id. at 231–32.
See id. at 232–33.
See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
COTTAM, RADICAL HELP, supra note 28, at 45.
See id. at 45–46.
Id. at 46.
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the social connections among people—and not only those among
blood relations.249 Accordingly, “[w]e need to create systems that
make participation easy, intuitive[,] and natural. And to do this we
need to start in people’s lives. We need to stand in communities and
understand both the problems and the possibilities from this everyday
perspective.”250
Cottam’s vision for a new society devoted to the general welfare
tackles the worst impulses of entrenched, politicized, fundingdependent bureaucracy through a dogged, patient, deliberate process
of brainstorming, building relationships and trust, testing and finetuning, and finally, handing off the reins for continuing the journey to
local communities.251 What is replicated is not a cookie-cutter
welfare-in-a-box model, but a framework, process, and full-on
commitment to localized, community-based, participatory, and
shared systems of interdependence.252 The role of the state, while
crucial, is relegated to the background, as local actors and impacted
individuals lead the process and set the goals for public
administration.253
Like restorative justice, the capacity to be nimble, flexible,
responsive, and even go back to the drawing board if necessary, is in
stark contrast to the embedded and ossified procedures of large
bureaucracies, even where experienced government agency workers
retain substantial discretion and time to develop and implement
individualized solutions.254 As Cottam notes, many agency workers
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

See id. at 64–66, 205, 253–54.
Id. at 46.
See id. at 64–66, 71, 93–94, 104–05, 118–20, 171–73.
Id. at 216–18 (mapping out the design process).
See id. at 220, 222–23. Cottam’s work has influenced some advocates of coproduction as a more egalitarian and participatory form of public service provision
that expands rather than replaces minimum social support. See, e.g., GANNON &
LAWSON, supra note 71, at 21–22 (“This report works from a definition of coproduction as all service stakeholders work[] together to create or improve a service
by making it both more innovative and fairer. . . . It is about creating a new settlement
between government, workers and the people who use and need the services.”).
254. See COTTAM, RADICAL HELP, supra note 28, at 73–75. Cottam’s model differs in
important ways from superficially analogous models proposed in the U.S. to make
expensive and ineffective punitive models more client-centered and individualized—
but still administered by government agencies vesting discretion in agency workers.
See, e.g., Michelle Derr, Key Considerations for TANF Reauthorization, THE HILL
(Oct. 7, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/464644-ke
y-considerations-for-tanf-reauthorization [https://perma.cc/RX82-BTEX] (advocating
use in state workfare agencies of “[s]trategies such as WOOP (Wish, Outcome,
Obstacle, Plan), also called mental contrasting, implement intentions, mindfulness,
and structured goal pursuit practices, which have been informed by recent advances in
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sincerely believe they are already engaging in the kind of relationship
building Cottam’s team emphasizes by managing individuals with
intensity but little ability to actually elicit voluntary behavioral
changes through concrete forms of help, however small.255 Experts
and professionals tasked with administering social welfare programs
may burn out or become complicit in their gatekeeper status, and thus
become unable to accurately identify the root causes of the
challenges facing the people they are paid to help.256 “It is hard to
understand the realities of each other’s lives. And this gap in
understanding becomes a gulf when we are in a position of power or
authority and try to help others.”257
Cottam’s frustration with bureaucracy and its constraints comes
through loud and clear.258 She criticizes knee-jerk resistance to new
solutions: “See the same doctor? Too expensive. Help another young
person? Too risky. Provide through a known community group?
Against the rules of competition.”259 Glossed over are very real
problems of prejudice, power, and privacy, including but not limited
to possible youth or elder abuse in the private sphere without
nuanced oversight.260 As with individual nonlinear progress—in
which a step forward may be precisely the point at which the greatest
challenges present themselves—the task of moving beyond
individuals to developing broader networks that facilitate
relationships reveals the constraints of the relational approach.261
Conflicts of interest, ulterior motives, exploitation, prejudice, and
bias may go unchecked where no government official is ultimately

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

behavioral science[.]”); see also MICHELLE DERR ET AL., OFF. OF PLAN., RSCH., &
EVALUATION, OPRE REP. NO. 2019-40, IMPROVING EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES: USING
INNOVATIVE GOAL-ORIENTED STRATEGIES IN TANF PROGRAMS 2–6, 11 (2019),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/50020_goals_rb_improving_employ
ment_outcomes_022119_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3AF-EZCN] (“The interventions
. . . are well-grounded in the science of self-regulation and are designed to help
participants reach their personal and job-related goals.”).
See COTTAM, RADICAL HELP, supra note 28, at 10–11.
See id. at 10–11, 73–75.
Id. at 212.
See id. at 44.
Id.
Id. at 58–59, 67.
See Milena Marchesi, The Intimate Public of Relational Welfare in Milan,
ETHNOGRAPHY, Feb. 23, 2020, at 1, 3, 11, 13–14, 16–17, 19–20, https://journals
.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1466138119897094 (describing problems relational
welfare workers encounter in trying to build networks); see also Cottam, The
Relational Society, supra note 11, at 105–06.
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responsible for any given relationship with a vulnerable person.262
The risk of toxic yet invisible abuse or prejudice lurks in the most
intimate of relationships, and radical help is not immune to such
concerns where legal protections or government oversight are sparse,
whether through neglect or by design.263 While restorative practices
could play some role in resolving such situations, they may be even
less effective in a context devoid of systemwide procedural
protections as a backstop.264
As with restorative justice, the participation of individuals willing
to expose their life challenges to the scrutiny of neighbors,
community members, and social workers on a voluntary basis
potentially subjects them to judgment by others. Such interactions
may occur with insufficient oversight if the social relationships
formed remain private, with no recourse for private harms, including
everything from financial exploitation to emotional or sexual abuse
by those purporting to help.265 As with Failinger’s restorative justice
model, radical help remains rooted in existing political and economic
structures of power and privilege that exploit any difference to
sustain inequality.266 We cannot be certain that the benefits of
individual connections—even according to Cottam’s different
measures and assuming a baseline guarantee of minimum basic
support for all—are worth the risks of possible abuses.267
Finally, Cottam herself recognizes the particular danger of
relegating individuals disengaged from society, disproportionately
women of color, to the work of relationships—whether as
uncompensated careworkers in the home, or through underpaid,
devalued, exploitative labor in other people’s homes—without
adequate safeguards and support.268 Her radical help would be for
262. See Marchesi, supra note 261 at 14, 19–20.
263. See id. at 14, 17, 19–20 (noting that even professionals involved in relational help
approaches have biases and inequality of relationships with families they help makes
it easy to disrupt familial autonomy).
264. See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
265. See COTTAM, RADICAL HELP, supra note 28, at 58, 67.
266. Id. at 245–46, 248–49.
267. See Cottam, Relational Welfare, supra note 28, at 141–44.
268. Cottam, The Relational Society, supra note 11, at 105; see Nancy E. Shurtz, LongTerm Care and the Tax Code: A Feminist Perspective on Elder Care, 20 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 107, 110, 129–30 (2018) (describing low economic status of paid direct
caregivers to the elderly); see also Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State:
Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 324 (2013)
(“[A]s wealthier women seek to meet the care needs of their families, they employ
poor, disproportionately immigrant women and provide them with generally low
wages and even fewer benefits.”).
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naught if it merely resulted in women taking on even more of the
burden to support community members in need, in addition to family
members and employers.269 Cottam takes some proponents of
relational forms of welfare to task for failing to account for the
gendered aspects of a system built around relationships that have kept
women in the home or limited to low-paid care work in the labor
market.270 Even if welfare didn’t already have its sights on women’s
sexual and economic independence,271 the emphasis on private
relationships to solve structural inequality strikes Cottam as suspect,
as it should.272 As Cottam states:
Relationships are powerfully gendered, and . . . without
exploring these dynamics head-on, we will push some of
our deepest social challenges behind doors and back into the
domestic sphere, just as happened in the 1950s welfare
state, which in reality depended largely on women to
shoulder the care of the young and old[.]273
To the contrary, like some other feminist theorists, Cottam seeks to
transform societal disregard for private relationships, thereby
reversing the dynamic that denigrates them.274 “In our everyday
lives, relationships feel as if they are in conflict with the market and
with state bureaucracy.”275 She prefers to redefine and remake
relationships to maximize their promise, protecting against the worst
abuses as a way of resisting pressure under workfare ideology to
abandon the private sphere for low-paid work: “The expressed aims
are no longer those of nurture, well-being and quality of life; rather,
there is ambition to keep as many of us as possible in the labour
market for as long as possible—each day and over the years.”276
Ultimately, Cottam’s proposal is one attempt to empower
individuals within relationships as a way to invest in, valorize, and
269. See Cottam, The Relational Society, supra note 11, at 105.
270. See id.; see also Maxine Eichner, Market-Cautious Feminism, 69 STUD. L. POL. &
SOC’Y 141, 141 (2016) (describing ways “in which women’s participation in the labor
market is mistakenly equated with liberation” while “other far-ranging effects of the
market system on women’s lives inside and outside of work - many of them negative
- are overlooked” yet require regulation “to serve women’s interests.”).
271. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
272. See Cottam, The Relational Society, supra note 11, at 105–06.
273. Id. at 105.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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even compensate or reciprocate the relational work that all
community members do, and could do in an even more powerful and
productive fashion, with visibility and value.277 The appeal of
relational welfare is strong if only because so few options or
opportunities have centered on women’s own agency in
counteracting entrenched stereotypes and structural biases.278
Whether women—particularly low-income women of color—can
succeed in reclaiming the choice to participate in the labor market or
engage in carework without getting stuck in one sphere or the other,
remains to be seen.
The challenge remains of how to break out of dichotomies of
dominance.279 While trying to shore up the value of relational work
and resist being forced into labor market participation without power
or support,280 we currently lack the legal safeguards to make
relational support a meaningful guarantee for all, rather than an
aspiration only for some.281 This may be the Achilles heel of radical
help; if characterized as affirmative support above and beyond a
minimum level of subsistence support, it becomes extraneous,
discretionary, and therefore neither legally nor politically guaranteed,
and not equally accessible to all.282 Cottam’s own critique of relying
on gendered relationships to save or strengthen society raises
precisely these concerns and may not yet, without more, be able to
surmount them.283
IV. REIMAGINING WORK AND CARE BEYOND WORKFARE’S
MARKET-FAMILY DIVIDE
Failinger’s attempt to reduce the harm of workfare sanctions
through restorative justice284 and Cottam’s more “radical” plan to
boost individual capabilities through relational welfare285 offer
humane solutions, while recognizing the challenges of dismantling
structural barriers to economic security.286 Even if scaled up for
widespread use, both proposals leave those who are unable or
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

See supra notes 235–37 and accompanying text.
See Cottam, The Relational Society, supra note 11, at 106.
See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.
See Cottam, Relational Welfare, note 28, at 135–36.
See id.
See Cottam, The Relational Society, supra note 11, at 105.
See supra notes 9, 21–22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.
See Failinger, supra note 9, at 238; see also Cottam, Relational Welfare, supra note
28, at 134.
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unwilling to participate in the market for paid work dependent on
private relationships for support, with no mechanism for public
accountability that would hold the government responsible for
ensuring basic minimum protections.287 Holding out the private
sphere (even with active community participation) as the primary
source of social support may be insufficient without effective
oversight and safeguards against abuses of discretion or private
power.288 Both proposals thus risk reinscribing a divide between the
family sphere and the labor market that limits individual choices and
opportunities.289
Feminists have long been wary of the restoration of the private
family sphere as an alternative to the labor market because of the
perpetual devaluation—sometimes disguised as romanticization—of
women’s place in the home.290 They have rejected nostalgia for the
devolved domestic sphere as an ideal, safe, insular space from which
to resist market forces and state intervention.291 By relegating
women’s dependent carework to the private sphere, society
permits—and depends on—their subjugation within that very sphere
to reproduce the next generation of low-wage labor.292 Any new
formulation of social welfare provision that reinscribes this private
sphere may only disrupt, but not transform, the existing punitive
workfare system, rendering it less harsh but still preventing it from
fully supporting the dignity and empowerment of all.293
It may yet be possible to envision new models of welfare provision
that can alleviate the harms of poverty and ensure affirmative support
for individuals, and begin to counteract the devaluation and
disempowerment of particular social roles in the process.294 Feminist
287. See Failinger, supra note 9, at 209; see Cottam, Relational Welfare, supra note 28, at
135; see also Robson, supra note 2, at 15 (“[W]e should renew the quest for a more
positive constitutionalism in which we routinely make demands on government rather
than emphasize its limits.”).
288. See Robson, supra note 2, at 15.
289. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text.
290. See Gilman, supra note 90, at 14–15.
291. See Eichner, supra note 37, at 98–99 (citing Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983)); see
also Gilman, supra note 90, at 1 (“[Second-wave feminists] assailed the patriarchal
divide between the public and the private sphere that trapped women in the home and
subjected them to domestic abuse.”).
292. See Eichner, supra note 37, at 114–15.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 11–14.
294. See Hi’ilei Julia Kawehipuaakahaopulani Hobart & Tamara Kneese, Radical Care:
Survival Strategies for Uncertain Times, 38 SOC. TEXT 1, 9–10 (2020), http://re
ad.dukeupress.edu/social-text/article-pdf/38/1(142)/1/781472/0380001.pdf [https://pe
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and antiracist theorists argue that women have long traveled between
private and public spheres out of need or desire, but always at great
cost, including costs disparately borne by women of color.295 They
highlight the need for greater support for women’s freedom to choose
whether and when to participate in either sphere, including bolstering
women’s competitiveness in the labor market and/or compensating
carework in the home.296 Remaking social support to address the
deficiencies of privileging one sphere over the other thus requires
grappling with the same contested notions of agency, choice,
autonomy, and subjectivity that feminist and antiracist theorists have
long confronted.297
Feminist legal scholars observe that women have always
participated in wage work outside the home, but subject to
discrimination and without supports, leaving some to rely on the
marketplace to purchase substitute childcare.298 Like Cottam,299 they
remain critical of an unquestioned assumption that social welfare can
be fully relational without substantial transformation of existing
power dynamics and structures that leave some women to do all the
carework regardless of whether they also work for wages outside the
home.300 Such reforms may seem superficial or shortsighted where
they seek to remedy that disparity merely by compensating care labor
in the home, rather than fully empowering all individuals to have
meaningful choices while deciding whether and when to engage in
carework or other forms of labor.301
More comprehensively, Maxine Eichner argues against a freemarket vision of family that supports and reproduces itself solely
through reliance on private, domestic carework, as the purported
result of rational informed choices and resource maximization that is

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

rma.cc/EZ7V-S7UZ]. New theorists of radical care reject the notion that private
radical care need be abusive or hierarchical. See id. at 10. They seek to mobilize
individuals to collectively create and employ participatory mechanisms for creating
horizontal networks of radical care based in mutual, reciprocal fulfillment of material
needs independent of formal governmental state structures or authority. See id.
See id. at 11.
See id. at 6.
See Eichner, supra note 37, at 98.
See id. at 108–12.
See generally supra Part III.
See Maxine Eichner, The Privatized American Family, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 213,
215–18 (2017).
MAXINE EICHNER, THE FREE-MARKET FAMILY: HOW THE MARKET CRUSHED THE
AMERICAN DREAM (AND HOW IT CAN BE RESTORED) xxiv, xix (2019) (advocating for
“pro-family policies” that “allow workers to limit their work hours[] [to] help[] them
spend more time with their families without reducing their wages.”).
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based on market exchange value alone.302 In contrast, she advances
targeted “pro-family” policies through which the state supports
people in nurturing others without sacrificing their own economic
security, arguing that the government plays a key role in optimizing
genuine choices for all without unduly privileging or devaluing the
private sphere.303 Eichner recognizes the importance of bonds among
family—defined more broadly than the heteronormative nuclear
unit—and argues that the state must protect them against market
forces that “leave[] significant gaps in the economic system in
ensuring families have what they need to thrive.”304 If backed by
strong government support and oversight, restorative or relational
approaches to workfare could form part of this necessary buffer.305
From a different vantage point, Martha Fineman’s concept of
responsive government represents a broader vision of universal social
support. She envisions a system centered not on an idealized
autonomous worker able to purchase all they need, but on a universal
vulnerable subject—vulnerable at different times and life stages, and
in need of some form of support from society at every phase of
life.306 No particular type of vulnerability or ability would be
prioritized over others or used to justify discrimination or
subordination, as vulnerability in general is experienced by all, at a
minimum in infancy and old age—though with greater or lesser harm
for some populations.307 Even in this scenario, the relative
vulnerability of individuals at different times and for different
reasons may continue to fall into categories in line with traditional

302. See Eichner, supra note 37, at 102–03; see also EICHNER, supra note 301, at xix
(“[M]any things that people need to flourish, like the nurturing that parents provide,
aren’t distributed through markets. And some things that can be distributed through
markets, like high-quality daycare, aren’t affordable for many families.”).
303. See Eichner, supra note 37, at 102–03.
304. EICHNER, supra note 301, at xxvi; see Eichner, supra note 37, at 102 (“[A] broad
range of relationships should be supported as ‘families.’”); see also Eichner, supra
note 300, at 216–17 (arguing that government should buffer families from the effects
of market forces).
305. See EICHNER, supra note 301, at xvii (“[T]he defeat of American families by market
forces . . . . occurred because, beginning in the 1970s, American policymakers began
to sell families out to a misguided ideal of free markets” rather than “buffer[ing]
families from harmful market forces.”); see also Eichner, supra note 300, at 216–17.
306. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60
EMORY L.J. 251, 255–56 (2010) [hereinafter Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject];
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1–2 (2008).
307. See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 306, at 266–67.
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concepts of desert or need, whether based in morality, ability, or
financial circumstances.308
By identifying vulnerability as a shared universal condition,
Fineman argues that society owes each and every member protection
and support against deprivation, but the question remains to what
degree for each individual, as we are vulnerable in different ways.309
Thus, Wendy Bach cautions, “if we are to build institutions that are
responsive to some of the most vulnerable among us, we must seek to
understand the particular institutional realities that constitute the
relationship between poor and disproportionately African-American
women and the current state,” and “ask how these particular realities
impact the path to a supportive or responsive state.”310 Bach details
the myriad ways in which administrative schemes ostensibly
designed to improve community welfare operate as a form of social
control instead.311 Unraveling and remedying the long history of
what Bach terms “hyperregulation” of low-income communities, and
especially Black women and women of color,312 may require more
than merely removing the harshest consequences or expanding basic
minimum support to all, but some form of reparations or, at a
minimum, rethinking of the particular relationships,313 perspectives,
and subjectivities privileged by existing welfare systems.314
Central to the project of reenvisioning social support and
reconciling the differences between universal or more targeted
solutions, is rethinking expectations or assumptions of the liberal
ideal of an autonomous, unitary, essential subject entitled to social
status. As a rational and efficient actor without cognitive bias or
interrelational dependency, this ideal subject is solely deserving of
social support because they are least in need of it.315 In fact, choice,
agency, and autonomy are contested and may be coopted by a
welfare model that frames women’s devaluation and subordination as
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

See id. at 268.
See Bach, supra note 268, at 319.
Id.
Id. at 372 (introducing “hyperregulation – the targeting by race, class, gender[,] and
place of particular people so as to exert social control on those people” through
administrative apparatus).
Id. at 319–20, 336.
See generally id. at 366–79 (discussing how to counteract the effects of
hyperregulation).
Id. at 366–70, 377.
See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY xiii (2004) (critiquing American “core myths . . . interwoven through
political rhetoric and popular ideology[,]” that promote “the desirability and
attainability of autonomy for individuals and families[.]”).
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the natural consequence of rational economic choices based on
perfect information and predictable priorities.316 Any critique that
fails to recognize the multiplicity of individual identities risks
entrenching a framework of bias or essentialism that confines
individuals to devalued social roles.317
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality has taken hold as
a complex critique of essentialist categories, such as race or gender,
without erasing the lived experiences and material needs of
individuals based on the multiplicity of identities they inhabit,
whether deliberately or incidentally.318 Rather than replacing one
flawed hierarchy with another, Crenshaw’s concept of
intersectionality questions and complicates the prioritization of any
one individual’s numerous chosen or perceived identities and,

316. See Martha McCluskey, The Politics of Economics in Welfare Reform, in FEMINISM
CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY 193, 193–94 (Martha
Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005) (decrying “conventional
wisdom” of neo-classical theory that uses “purportedly neutral economics principles
to . . . . attempt[] to make social welfare restrictions a matter of sensible science.”).
317. Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master’s
House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 16, 17, 22 (1995) (defining essentialism and
intersectionality, then discussing lessons to learn from the anti-essentialism and
intersectionality critiques).
318. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex] (explaining that focus on the most privileged members
of any particular group classification “marginalizes those who are multiply-burdened
and obscures claims that cannot be understood as resulting from discrete sources of
discrimination. . . . [T]his focus on otherwise-privileged group members creates a
distorted analysis of racism and sexism because the operative conceptions of race and
sex become grounded in experiences that actually represent only a subset of a much
more complex phenomenon.”); see Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Close Encounters of
Three Kinds: On Teaching Dominance Feminism and Intersectionality, 46 TULSA L.
REV. 151, 163 (2010) (inquiring “whether the theorization of race at issue takes
gender structures as given and theorization of gender that takes racial structures as a
given, reinforcing both structures by failing to contest them.”); see also BELL HOOKS,
FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 14–15, 92 (1984) (discussing the
“sexist, racist, and classist oppression” of Black women and the development of
“critical consciousness.”). But see Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Essay,
Intersectionality at 30: Mapping the Margins of Anti-Essentialism, Intersectionality,
and Dominance Theory, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2193, 2239 (2019) (seeking to
“disaggregate intersectionality from anti-essentialism [and] articulate, if you like, the
intersection [and tension] of dominance theory and intersectionality.”).
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crucially, the primacy of the legal, economic, and social institutional
structures that individuals choose to build and support.319
The lived experience of intersectionality becomes visible, at least
figuratively, in the “countermyth” of “cyborg” consciousness
presciently recognized by Donna Haraway, as both an embodiment of
and reflection of the complex hybrid identities occupied by people
both marginalized by and central to a capitalist system that depends
on their degraded labor.320 Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto”
describes the consignment of masses of people of color to a laborintensive carework economy in which they are simultaneously
essential and redundant due to high-tech innovations and
automation.321 Crenshaw, Haraway, and others provide modes of
critique and ways of thinking about living under and resisting
antiracist, neoliberal precarity.322 They reject the possibility of a
romantic ideal fantasy or an essentialist, unitary subjectivity, and
embrace the necessity of adapting and integrating the unnatural,
devalued, and/or unfamiliar into human existence.323 Cyborgs, even
if not literally combining machine with human parts, merge hitherto
distinct social spheres and categories into necessarily experimental,
prototypical, and iterative entities, rather than fixed or stable
selves.324 Like Cottam’s participants in radical help,325 cyborgs
coalesce around shared affinities rather than some essential,
predictable human nature in order to exist and resist obsolescence.326
319. See Jane Coaston, The Intersectionality Wars, VOX (May 28, 2019, 9:09 AM),
https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/5/20/18542843/intersectionality-conservati
sm-law-race-gender-discrimination [https://perma.cc/MF5T-4P4M].
320. Donna J. Haraway, A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist
Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century, in SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE
REINVENTION OF NATURE (1991) reprinted in MANIFESTLY HARAWAY 3, 7, 14, 16–17
(2016).
321. McKenzie Wark, Blog-Post for Cyborgs—McKenzie Wark on Donna Haraway’s
‘Manifesto for Cyborgs’ 30 Years Later, VERSO: BLOG (Sept. 28, 2015), https://
www.versobooks.com/blogs/2254-blog-post-for-cyborgs-mckenzie-wark-on-donna-h
araway-s-manifesto-for-cyborgs-30-years-later [https://perma.cc/K46V-PBVT].
322. Haraway, supra note 320, at 69 n.5; Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex, supra note 318, at 139–40.
323. Haraway, supra note 320, at 16–17; Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex, supra note 318, at 166–67.
324. Haraway, supra note 320, at 5–7.
325. See supra notes 231–37 and accompanying text.
326. Haraway, supra note 320, at 5–9, 14, 16–17, 21. Haraway and others recognized “a
strongly bimodal social structure, with the masses of women and men of all ethnic
groups, but especially people of color, confined to a homework economy” of
unpredictable, underpaid, and insecure work and characterized by “massive
intensification of insecurity and cultural impoverishment, with common failure of
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Restorative and relational approaches to economic security and social
support may begin the task of reimagining human connections in an
era of intense technological, ecological, and economic shifts as
similarly dynamic, organic spaces of possibility, rather than power or
powerlessness.327
Some may object that the time has not come to reject the rational
unitary subject with the powers of choice and agency, as entire
groups have been excluded from that privileged social position.328
Feminist and antiracist theorists may understandably be wary of
advancing any solution for the lived challenges of marginalized
individuals that expects them to jettison privileges or rights they have
only just begun to enjoy or still do not enjoy.329 Yet, while Haraway
rejects romanticism, famously purporting to “rather be a cyborg than
a goddess,”330 she may still leave open the possibility of deploying
what Angela Harris describes as “strategic identities” for resistance,
without settling into new forms of subordination.331
Perhaps some security can be found in Patricia J. Williams’s
enduring call for expansion of legal rights to those who have never
been accorded them—descendants of slaves, those deemed to lack
capacity to exercise rights, perhaps non-human companions or
natural resources—without nostalgia or romanticism.332 Williams is
wary of “discarding rights altogether” because of the meaning and
real impact fixed legal rights have for oppressed people:
Instead, society must give them away. Unlock them from
reification by giving them to slaves. Give them to trees.
Give them to cows. Give them to history. Give them to
rivers and rocks. Give to all of society’s objects and

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

subsistence networks for the most vulnerable.” Id. at 44, 49–50; see also Micki
McGee, Capitalism’s Care Problem: Some Traces, Fixes, and Patches, 38 SOC. TEXT
39, 55 (2020) (describing Haraway’s more recent exhortation to “stay[] with the
trouble,” which “demand[s] both improvisation and ingenuity[.]”).
See supra notes 9–11, 284–86 and accompanying text.
See generally FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND
SOCIETY (Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005).
Id.
Haraway, supra note 320, at 68.
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581, 610 (1990).
See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 146–65 (1991).
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untouchables the rights of privacy, integrity, and selfassertion; give them distance and respect.333
Such a move would recognize individual integrity, autonomy, and
dignity—and extend each without limit.334 Williams ends her appeal
with a rejection of neoliberal values of property ownership that seeks
to expand a narrow view of rights as scarce resources to be hoarded,
“so that we may say not that we own gold but that a luminous golden
spirit owns us.”335 At first glance, “a luminous golden spirit” may
sound like a kind of goddess presiding on a pedestal.336 Yet its
animating presence may have more in common with a cyborg
consciousness after all, in its recognition of how our all-too-human
selves continually reflect and reintegrate with social networks and
structures of our own making.337
CONCLUSION
Critical analysis of global responses to pandemics, natural
disasters, and disasters of human origin must highlight the entrenched
institutional and ideological barriers that continue to limit, albeit in
new and ever-evolving forms, human flourishing in communities.338
The COVID-19 pandemic and its disproportionate toll on Black
people and people of color with limited access to quality jobs, health
care, child care, and safe housing has only accelerated growing
popular support for feminist, antiracist, and antipoverty platforms
such as the Movement for Black Lives and the revived Poor People’s
Campaign,339 among numerous other grassroots campaigns.340 These

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id. at 165.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See generally Haraway, supra note 320, at 35–37, 67.
See supra text accompanying notes 1–7.
KIM PARKER ET AL., PEW RSCH. CTR., AMID PROTESTS, MAJORITIES ACROSS RACIAL
AND ETHNIC GROUPS EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THE BLACK LIVES MATTER MOVEMENT 5,
7–8 (2020), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/06/12/amid-protests-majorities-acr
oss-racial-and-ethnic-groups-express-support-for-the-black-lives-matter-movement/
[https://perma.cc/Z87V-AM6X]; Hannah Van Sickle, Poor People’s Campaign ‘A
Broad and Deep National Moral Fusion Movement’, THE BERKSHIRE EDGE (June 19,
2020), https://theberkshireedge.com/poor-peoples-campaign-a-broad-and-deep-nation
al-moral-fusion-movement/ [https://perma.cc/E894-BF6T]; see also MOVEMENT FOR
BLACK LIVES, www.m4bl.org [https://perma.cc/59M9-VVT6] (last visited Dec. 17,
2020); see also POOR PEOPLE’S CAMPAIGN: A NAT’L CALL FOR MORAL REVIVAL,
https://www.poorpeoplescampaign.org/ [https://perma.cc/9MB5-GCVK] (last visited
Dec. 17, 2020).
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movements have compelled policymakers, activists, and visionaries
to seek new solutions to intractable social problems of poverty,
inequality, prejudice, and disempowerment.341
Advocates of any new model of welfare administration must walk a
fine line between providing supportive safety nets and deepening
social stigma;342 between flexible, individually-tailored assistance
and equitably administered benefits subject to minimum due process
safeguards and privacy protections;343 and between the use of
technology to reduce bureaucracy and busywork associated with high
caseloads and the need to bolster the strength of human relationships
to alleviate real suffering.344 At the same time, new models must
move beyond confining dichotomies that punish disfavored choices,
experiences, or backgrounds and divide the poor and marginalized
into those deserving or undeserving of assistance.345
Restorative and relational iterations of social welfare reveal both
the stubbornness of ideology tying social support to moral desert,346
and the infinite creativity of individuals and communities to respond
to challenges.347 In the midst of increased urgency for solutions and
competing constraints and priorities, feminist, antiracist, and antipoverty advocates must bring their critical perspectives and lived
experiences to bear on the way forward.348 Persistent social
movements seeking widespread systemic change to eradicate
340. See, e.g., Recognizing the Duty of the Federal Government to Create a Green New
Deal, H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Chris Winters, It’s Time for a
Black New Deal, YES! MAG. (June 8, 2020), https://www.yesmagazine.org
/opinion/2020/06/08/black-america-wealth-racial-equity/ [https://perma.cc/EW3Z-Z9
PW].
341. See Tonya Mosley & Allison Hagan, ‘An Extraordinary Moment’: Angela Davis Says
Protests Recognize Long Overdue Anti-Racist Work, WBUR (June 19, 2020),
https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2020/06/19/angela-davis-protests-anti-racism [htt
ps://perma.cc/V3LV-VSJH].
342. See Robert A. Moffitt, The Deserving Poor, the Family, and the U.S. Welfare System,
52(3): 729–49 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 15–16 (June 2015).
343. See id.; see Background Briefing: The Civil Liberties Issues of Welfare Reform,
ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/background-briefing-civil-liberties-issues-welfarereform [https://perma.cc/M4LB-QHYC] (last visited Dec. 17, 2020).
344. JENNIFER EHRLE ET AL., URB. INST., WELFARE REFORM AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
COLLABORATION BETWEEN WELFARE AND CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES 1, 18, 20–21
(2001), http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/occa53.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3
UV-RQW2].
345. See Moffitt, supra note 342, at 14–15.
346. See supra notes 17–20, 40–49 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 73–75, 249–54 and accompanying text.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 294–97.
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oppression and subordination at its roots and in all its myriad
manifestations may be the living embodiment of cyborg
consciousness, mining both history and lived experience to salvage
what can still be used going forward without forever determining
future iterations.349 If nothing else, restorative justice and relational
principles applied to social welfare and safety net assistance create
imaginative space for expanding our experience and understanding of
need, capability, desert, and what humans have to offer each other.350
With no guarantee of success or progress, we at least have the
opportunity to repair, renew, and reinvent the human relationships we
need to survive and thrive now and in an uncertain future.351

349. See supra text accompanying notes 320–27.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 140–44.
351. See supra text accompanying notes 9–16.

